

## Energy Outlook – Global/Asian Region

Oil and Gas Energy Forum

Taipei, 4 July 2012



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**Resources**: Our use of the term "resources" in this presentation includes quantities of oil and gas not yet classified as SEC proved oil and gas reserves or SEC proven mining reserves. Resources are consistent with the Society of Petroleum Engineers 2P and 2C definitions.

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### **AGENDA**

- PART 1: TRENDS AND DRIVERS
- PART 2: ENERGY DRIVERS
- PART 3: ASIA ENERGY DEVELOPMENTS
- PART 4: SHELL ENERGY SCENARIOS TO 2050 SIGNALS & SIGNPOSTS

# PART 1

**TRENDS AND DRIVERS** 

#### **SIGNALS & SIGNPOSTS – A SNAPSHOT**

Intensified economic cycles following the end of the 'great moderation'


Heightened political instability

We have entered an 'era of volatile transitions'


Significant demographic transitions – urbanisation New political consensus building – a *minilateral* world

New planetary boundaries defined

#### **FOOD – WATER – ENERGY**



## **POPULATION AND PROSPERITY DRIVES ENERGY DEMAND**




SOURCE: SHELL ESTIMATES, UN

SOURCE: SHELL ESTIMATES


### **IMPACTS OF AN URBAN WORLD**

- 75% of world's population in cities by 2050
- Urban development decisions lock in city energy profile in the early stages
- Urban planning decisions historically reflect energy prices at the time of development (urban sprawl in the US linked to low gasoline prices)
- Can cities be the saviour of the global energy crunch extra-ordinary demand moderation?

#### **DENSER CITIES CONSUME LESS ENERGY**




### **CITIES IN THE ENERGY WEB**





**ENERGY DRIVERS** 

## THE ENERGY SYSTEM TODAY SETS THE CONTEXT FOR THE FUTURE




World population 7 bln; 50% in urban environment

## **HOW FAST CAN WE CHANGE?**


#### TECHNOLOGIES TAKE DECADES TO MATURE

Terajoule/yr





#### **EXAMPLE: PASSENGER ROAD TRANSPORT**

Billion vehicle kilometres




## **ENERGY INVESTMENT FUNDAMENTALS POSITIVE**





SOURCE: SHELL ANALYSIS


#### **OIL MARKET**




#### SOURCE: IEA WEO2010

SOURCE: IHS-CERA


## NATURAL GAS OUTLOOK




#### NATURAL GAS REGIONAL PRICES



#### **UNCONVENTIONAL GAS RESOURCES**



#### ATTRACTIVE ECONOMICS FOR ELECTRICITY PRODUCERS




SOURCE: PLATTS, NYMEX

SOURCE: WOODMACKENZIE; SHELL ANALYSIS BASED ON EU DATA

### **ALTERNATIVE ENERGY**

#### NON FOSSIL ENERGY GROWTH

Energy demand outlook in million boe/d



#### **SHELL BIOFUELS - BRAZIL**



SOURCE: IEA, SHELL


# PART 3

## **ASIAN ENERGY DEVELOPMENTS**

ASIAN ENERGY DEVELOPMENTS


Asia energy outlooks under current trends

**Energy Mix** 




This outlook is based on many assumptions and interpretations of possible future choices from today's perspective. Many uncertainties remain and many alternatives to this outlook are possible. It should be seen as a starting point for discussion and Shell by no means advocates this outlook as a preferred or inevitable one.

#### **ASIA'S SHARE IN WORLD TFC AND TPE**



#### World - Total Final Consumption

World - Total Primary Energy




FSB Energy - Shell WEM v2.4.13 - BBC12 - Normal Efficiency

FSB Energy - Shell WEM v2.4.13 - BBC12 - Normal Efficiency

Note: This outlook is an example only as it is based on extrapolation of current trends and assumptions around possible future choices. Many uncertainties remain and many alternatives to this outlook are possible therefore.


#### SOUTH ASIA POPULATION AND GDP



World - Population

South Asia

World - GDP



South Asia

FSB Energy - Shell WEM v2.4.13 - BBC12 - Normal Efficiency

South Asia


India Pakistan Bangladesh Rest of South Asia


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
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#### **SOUTH ASIA TFC AND TPE**







FSB Energy - Shell WEM v2.4.13 - BBC12 - Normal Efficiency

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
Bangladesh

Rest of South Asia

10

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#### **SE ASIA POPULATION AND GDP**






World - Population

SE Asia

Singapore

SE Asian population grows x% pa from ~600 mln to 720 mln.

SE AsiaIndonesiaThailandMalaysiaFSB Energy - Shell WEM v2.4.17 - BBC12 - Version ReleaseVietnamPhilippines



World - GDP

SE Asia

SE Asian GDP/capita growths 2.9% pa from 5,500 to 11,000 (2011-2035)


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
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### **SE ASIA TFC AND TPE**



#### SE Asia - Total Primary Energy - By Source




FSB Energy - Shell WEM v2.4.13 - BBC12 - Normal Efficiency

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Singapore


#### **EAST ASIA POPULATION AND GDP**



SE Asian population hardly grows and remains around

World - Population

World - GDP



East Asia

SE Asian GDP/capita growths 4.5% pa from \$11,500 to \$33,160 (2011-2035)

 FSB Energy - Shell WEM v2.4.17 - BBC12 - Version Release
 East Asia China Japan South Korea

 FSB Energy - Shell WEM v2.4.17 - BBC12 - Version Release

 North Korea

Taiwan


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1.6 bln people


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#### **EAST ASIA TFC AND TPE**







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
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## PART 4

SHELL ENERGY SCENARIOS TO 2050 SIGNALS & SIGNPOSTS

## WHY DO WE USE SCENARIOS?



- To ask "what if" questions, not necessarily give answers
- Not forecasts or predictions
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- Dealing with uncertainties greater, and time scales longer, than anyone can make predictions for
- Today's complexity requires a broad dialogue with diverse communities to arrive at sustainable solutions
- Broaden peoples' perspective
- Challenging assumptions and mental models
- Develop strategies and test plans
- Identifying risks and opportunities
- Relevant to business and policy decision makers

## **2008 ENERGY SCENARIOS TO 2050** National supply focus and reactive change Demography Demand Environment competition BLUEPRINTS SCRAMBLE ۲ $(\mathcal{O})$ Choices Resources Technology **Emerging coalitions** and accelerated change

## **GREENER THAN BLUEPRINTS...?**

- Blueprints lower CO<sub>2e</sub> than most scenario analyses but still
   650ppm by 2100\*
- If 450ppm ≈2°C, Blueprints still isn't good enough
- Truly unprecedented pace of transformational investment would be required









# Key insights from Shell's Energy Scenarios to 2050

- The three hard truths that must be tackled together
  - Accelerating demand from emerging economies
  - Supply struggling to keep pace
  - Climate change stresses rising



- Transformation in energy systems is inevitable
  - Profound impact on mobility, buildings and electricity generation
- Technology plays an important role, but cannot do it alone demand reduction and behaviour changes are also required
- Political and regulatory choices are pivotal short and long term measures are necessary
- Blueprints approach offers more chance of a sustainable future...but more needs to be done ... 2° target will not be met


# KEY DRIVERS IN GLOBAL POLITICS

- G20 vs G8 a global role for more nations?
  - China/US a crucial new relationship between the established and emerging world orders
- Policy paradigm reshaping the liberal capitalist model.
   Re-emergence of state intervention and industrial policy
- Burdens of adjustment choices on taxation, inflation targets, and public spending will impact who bears the costs
  - **Simmering discontent** unemployment, rising commodity prices

## **ECONOMIC SIGNALS**

An end to the 'great moderation' Reduced trend growth?

## Heightened <sup>o</sup> <sup>b</sup> economic volatility



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# Changing demographics and economic landscape



#### Step change in energy use by global rise in population and prosperity

Supply from conventional energy resources outstripped leading to stresses


Environmental stresses –  $CO_2$  and emerging tensions for water, food, land, etc

#### Energy drivers and the zone of uncertainty




#### **ENERGY GAMECHANGERS...?**

#### World-Total Primary Energy Demand - By Region




#### World-Total Primary Energy Supply




- Shift in consumption power from West to East
- Pressures on oil production
  - Supply power shifting to OPEC?
  - Iraq oil uptake & arrangements
  - Higher cost options
  - LTO uptake
- Natural gas, abundant and affordable
  - Unconventional gas in US (and elsewhere?)
- Shifting mix of primary energies
  - Efficiency affecting demand especially in Transport
  - Substitution in Transport and Electricity
  - Renewables
  - Nuclear post Japan?

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#### **ENERGY RELATED CO<sub>2</sub> EMISSIONS**



CO2 Pathways



#### Non-OECD has overtaken OECD

- Political process too slow
  - Transparent CO<sub>2</sub> price urgently needed
- Abundant natural gas
  - BLUEPRINTS: early CO<sub>2</sub> saving as a replacement fuel for coal in power generation
  - SCRAMBLE: Energy efficiency measures depressed
- Nuclear slowdown will bring coal back
  - Can renewables accelerate further?

#### **ENVIRONMENTAL SCHISMS**




Table 1. Planetary Boundaries	Status
Climate Change (atmospheric $CO_2$ concentration and change in radiative forcing)	Boundary Exceeded
Rate of Biodiversity Loss	Boundary Exceeded
Nitrogen Cycle - part of a boundary with the Phosphorus Cycle	Boundary Exceeded
Phosphorus Cycle - part of a boundary with the Nitrogen Cycle	Approaching Limit
Ocean acidification	Approaching Limit
Global freshwater use	Approaching Limit
Change in land use	Approaching Limit
Stratospheric ozone depletion	Not exceeded
Atmospheric aerosol loading	Not yet quantified
Chemical pollution	Not yet quantified

- An uneven road from Kyoto to Durban
  - continued divergence on CO<sub>2</sub> policy is politically unsustainable
- Fallout from *Macondo* and *Fukushima*a higher public awareness of risk
- New planetary boundaries work points to imminent systemic ecosystem stress
  - Inks to Water, Food and Energy

## Q& A

Views

## Discussion



